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Abstract 
Although Ernesto Laclau argues that heterogeneity is at the core of homogeneity, I 
argue that his account of heterogeneity ultimately pulverizes it. In his work, 
heterogeneity either becomes colonized (invisible and disavowed), or it becomes 
excluded (highly visible, penalized and anxiety provoking). Laclau’s uncritical 
deployment of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and its modernist 
epistemological dualism, I argue, lead him to not only theorize heterogeneity as 
racialized/feminine excess that needs to be excluded for meaning to emerge, but also, 
to conceptualize populism as the performative homogenizing production of the 
(phallic) signifier of the “One.” My paper stresses the political and conceptual 
problems of such a formulation.  
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Becoming the People: A Critique of the Populist Aesthetics of Homogeneity  
 
Introduction: The Limits of Heterogeneity in Laclau’s Theory of Populism 
The concept of heterogeneity has always informed the work of Ernesto Laclau. Its 
different theorizations (particularly through the concepts of antagonism, dislocation 
and social heterogeneity) accounts for both the impossibility of closure of a system of 
meaning and what allows meaning to emerge. As Laclau and Mouffe argued during the 
1980s, the political takes place within the antagonistic gap opened precisely by 
heterogeneity. In Laclau’s words: “It is the very lack within the structure that is at the 
origin of the structure. This means that we not only have subject positions within the 
structure, but also the subject as an attempt to fill these structural gaps.”1 The filling of 
these gaps takes place through hegemonic formations that involve logics of 
articulation, nodal points and relations of equivalence; as well as exclusion of, and 
antagonism with, that which appears as a threat to a given hegemonic formation. Put 
differently, Laclau confronts us with an ontological dimension of the social 
characterized by an intrinsic and unavoidable lack and by an ontic expression of this 
ontology. The latter consists in the permanent creation of provisional hegemonic 
closures that cover (discursively and as we will see later, also affectively) the 
antagonistic gap. The first refers to the realm of the political (or ontological) and the 
second to the realm of politics (the contingent or ontic). Although Laclau’s theory only 
addresses the relation between the logics of these dimensions - asserting that their 
content will be defined by the specificity of contingent hegemonic struggles - I argue 
that this operation involves something rather different. Through scrutinizing the 
concept of heterogeneity in the work of Laclau, I argue that the realm of the ontic or 
contingency is already “overdetermined” by the ontology. As we will see in detail in 
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what follows, heterogeneity ultimately refers to what exceeds the limits of 
representation. In this sense, and given the Kantian and Lacanian influences in 
Laclau’s theory of populism, I argue that the lack is not without a content, as certain 
bodies and identities are always already signified as lacking what it takes to belong to 
the “system” of meaning. This raises fundamental questions as per the status of 
contingency in any hegemonic formation, but most evidently, in the hegemonic 
formation of populism. Populism, I will argue, constitutes a symbolic, affective and 
aesthetic renewal of racisms and heteronormative patriarchy. Although at first sight 
one might think that this only characterizes right-wing populisms (where migrants in 
particular are nowadays targeted with exclusionary and punitive discourses and 
policies), in my paper I do not distinguish right and left populism. Although 
discursively they present themselves in different –even antagonistic ways - their modus 
operandi and epistemological assumptions, remains exactly the same: the 
singularization of heterogeneity.
2
  
Let us slowly start unpacking these ideas. Having dismissed any emancipatory or a 
teleological process that would result from a dialectical resolution, and arguing that 
society is organized around a constitutive lack, it is no surprise that Laclau would 
focus on the study of populism. According to him, this hegemonic political formation 
succeeds in both the production of a needed homogeneity in the context of highly 
heterogeneous contemporary global capitalism (through the construction of the empty 
signifier ‘the people’), while at the same time, being emancipatory, transgressive and 
anti-status quo. As Laclau explains, this hegemonic formation takes place through the 
articulation between the particular and the universal: “Something which does not cease 
to be particular has to demonstrate its right to identify its own particular aims with the 
universal emancipatory aims of the community.”3 In this case, the particular plebs 
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would claim the universality of the people: “There is a fullness of a community which 
is missing. This is decisive: the construction of the ‘people’ will be the attempt to give 
a name to that absent fullness.”4 In Laclau’s account, because the relation between 
particularity and universality is marked by a space of irreducible heterogeneity that 
guarantees the radical contingency of any hegemonic articulation, there is no definite 
answer to the question regarding which form of particularity will be capable of 
embodying totality. As a result, hegemonies are always “unstable and undecidable.”5 
Linda Zerilli comments, “demonstrating the imbrication of the universal and the 
particular, Laclau shows why it is a matter not of choosing one over the other but of 
articulating, in a scrupulously political sense, the relation between the two.”6 
In this paper, I examine the tensions that emerge in this process of articulation, 
particularly focusing on the concept of heterogeneity. More specifically, by showing 
how Laclau’s thought is profoundly bound to modernist ontological conceptions of 
totality and border (and its related epistemological dualisms), I argue that his claim to 
radical historicism has an important blind spot. The significant links and similarities 
between Laclau’s conceptualization of the heterogenous and what has been broadly 
theorized in post-colonial, ‘race’ and gender theory as racialized feminine threat7 
shows us that, instead of instability and undecidability, what we have is over-
determination and foreclosure of populist articulations and embodiment. Indeed, to 
counteract this threat, the radical investment of the signifier of the “one” (or phallic 
function of signification) is required to secure the process of singularization of the 
multiple and the nominalization of the heterogeneous.
8
 This (ontological) grammar of 
threat and border, I argue, informs populist articulations in their inevitable racialization 
and feminization. This operation does not only affect the logics of antagonism (with 
what remains excluded from the chain of equivalence) but also the workings of the 
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“interior” of the identity. Citing Franz Fanon,9 I call this logic the epidermalization of 
the social, as heterogeneity either becomes colonized (invisible and disavowed) when 
included within the populist hegemonic formation; or, it becomes excluded (highly 
visible, penalized and anxiety provoking) if located on the other side of the 
antagonistic frontier. My conclusion is that, far from emancipatory and anti-status quo, 
populism secures instead the very conditions for the reproduction of power.  
Ignoring the political implications of these conceptual choices, Laclau puts forward 
a conceptualization of populist embodiment and spatialization that both fails to account 
for the structural exclusions that inaugurated the modernist-democratic project in its 
construction of the nodal point “man” (or the human),10 and for the way these 
exclusions are reproduced in the very process of (populist) homogenization. That is, in 
spite of Laclau’s quick dismissal of Claude Lefort’s liberal conceptualization of the 
‘empty space’ of democracy (by arguing that emptiness is not a datum but a political 
construction), he seems to be equally oblivious of the exclusions and histories of 
embodiment of that empty space.
11
 In my view, the distribution of the emptying of 
articulated demands in the construction of the empty signifier of ‘the people’ becomes 
yet another platform for increasing inequality and exclusion. My argument is not only 
that there is a history of unevenness of power that makes certain populist articulations 
more likely to succeed in their hegemonic struggle over others, but that the very 
ontology in which the theory is built upon, already “indicates” a type of racial/sexual 
exclusion associated to the paradigm of totality, border and threat. Populism, in this 
context, (re)instaurates an homogenizing aesthetic regime of total visibility, so as to 
secure the working of its fantasy of homogeneous plenitude. 
In what follows I start by examining Laclau’s definition of heterogeneity in its 
various formulations to subsequently show how heterogeneity is cancelled out through 
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the totalizing discursive and affective performative operation of populism. In the third 
section of the paper, I analyze the logics of embodiment that derive from Laclau’s 
theorizing of spatialization, and I finish with a critique of the aesthetics of 
homogeneity that inform populism. 
 
The Opening Up: The Promise of the ‘Real’  
I would like to start by showing the relevance of the concept of the real – as what 
guarantees heterogeneity - in the work of Ernesto Laclau. In their book Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe present the notion of antagonism in order to 
account for the structural openness of the social.
12
 For them synonymy, metonymy and 
metaphor are the primary terrain where the social – and the subject within it - becomes 
constituted.
13
 Although the permanent displacement of meaning accounts for radical 
historicity, ultimately some forms of fixation and an antagonistic frontier are required 
for meaning to emerge, according to Laclau and Mouffe. Accordingly, “the practice of 
articulation consist in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meanings; 
and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a 
result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of 
the field of discursivity.”14 Among the elements that participate within the system, and 
that relate with the outside element in the same antagonistic way, a relation of 
equivalence is constituted: though each of their identities is different, they are 
analogous in their relation of exclusion with the same outside. The increase of the logic 
of equivalence among them involves a process of emptying of their meaning, allowing 
for one of the single elements to represent the system’s totality, even if inadequately. 
This is what Laclau later called the “empty signifier.”15 According to Laclau and 
 8 
Mouffe, the logic of hegemony consists in the power of over-determining the meaning 
of the elements (originally in a situation of dislocation or instability) at play. 
It is important to remark, however, that antagonism, “far from being an 
objective relation, is a relation wherein the limits of every objectivity are shown.”16 
The concept of objectivity and its limits are central in this argument: objectivity 
depends on the construction of equivalences and the existence of an antagonistic 
frontier. As objectivity has a limit (something/someone exceeds or lacks objectivity), 
full articulations are ultimately impossible: “as we have demonstrated, the social only 
exists as a partial effort for constructing society, that is, an objective and closed system 
of differences – antagonism, as a witness of the impossibility of a final suture, is the 
‘experience’ of the limit of the social. Strictly speaking, antagonisms are not internal 
but external to society; or rather, they constitute the limits of society, the latter’s 
impossibility of fully constituting itself.”17 
As Slavoj Žižek,, Paula Biglieri and Gloria Perello have shown, already in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy the importance of Lacanian thought is evident in the 
conceptualization of heterogeneity as an unavoidable fissure that is constitutive of the 
social: “Laclau and Mouffe have, so to speak, reinvented the Lacanian notion of the 
Real as impossible; they have made it useful as a tool for social and ideological 
analysis.”18 I would add here - although I will expand on this later – that the Kantian 
inspiration in their notion of border and totality as conditions for signification is also 
clear. It is in Laclau’s New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, however, that a 
full-blown Lacanian turn can be discerned.
19
 In that book, Laclau starts defining the 
subject as constituted by a lack.
20
 As we will see in what follows, Kantian/Lacanian 
thought will also inform Laclau’s On Populist Reason, this time, through a direct 
engagement with the work of Joan Copjec. 
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Lasse Thomassen explains how the new theorizing of heterogeneity, this time 
through the notion of dislocation leads towards the rethinking of interiority and 
exteriority as always marked by a fissure: “Heterogeneity stands ‘in an undecidable 
tension between internality and externality’ vis-a`-vis the boundaries of the discourse;” 
that is, nothing is purely internal or purely external.
21
 To a certain extent, the notion of 
dislocation dissolves the border that separates the inside from the outside, as 
heterogeneity (different from antagonism) is never a pure outside that threatens the 
existence of the identity. Internality too is threatened by heterogeneity, and as such, it 
inhabits the very logic of the internal hegemonic constitution.
22
 Different from a 
dialectical model that supposes a coherent unfolding of antagonisms and their 
reversals, on this view, it is the political articulation of heterogeneous elements what 
becomes constitutive of the social. If the previous concept of antagonism resulted from 
the articulatory practice of producing equivalences, the concept of dislocation hints 
towards an experience of excess, or what precisely escapes articulation or even 
antagonistic social relations: “Heterogeneity is excessive and undecidable (…) it 
escapes the attempt to conceptualize social relations in antagonistic terms. Yet the 
‘exclusion’ of the heterogeneous from the antagonism also makes the antagonism 
possible.”23 Mobilizing this conceptualization of dislocation in his study of populism, 
Laclau defines the heterogeneous as what remains outside not only of a particular 
system of representation, but what remains outside of the space of representation as 
such: “the kind of outside that I am now discussing presupposes exteriority not just to 
something within the space of representation, but to the space of representation as 
such. I will call this type of exteriority, social heterogeneity. Heterogeneity, conceived 
this way, does not mean difference, two entities, in order to be different, need a space 
within which that difference is representable, while what I am now calling 
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heterogeneity presupposes the absence of that common space.”24 This radical fissure, 
in the context of the constitution of ‘the people’, means that heterogeneity cannot be 
erased through any sort of dialectical homogenization.
25
 
Heterogeneity, or so it seems, is now firmly secured in this theoretical 
framework. However, and as we will see in the following section, Laclau’s 
commitments to order (as a sociological category) and to totality (as a philosophical 
and psychoanalytic one) lead him to cancel heterogeneity and favor instead, 
singularity. Most importantly, it is precisely this radicalization of the Kantian-Lacanian 
understanding of social heterogeneity – as what remains outside of the field of 
representation - that in my view ends up cancelling the radical openness of the social. 
That is, although the notion of social heterogeneity secures the instability of any 
identity, I argue that the dichotomy between representation (or social objectivity) and 
its limits, precludes such radical instability. Instead, certain identities and bodies are 
already being signified as repositories of lack, with or without a border, coherence, 
limit and even intentionality.
26
 
We have now established the problematic relation between this understanding 
of social objectivity (or the possibility of meaning) and the enlightenment/modernist 
definition of what constitutes “man” or the “human.” In this sense, we can now argue 
that populist fantasies of plenitude are not that different from colonial fantasies where, 
upon the colonial (mis)encounter, a particular type of (racial and sexual) Western 
subjectivity emerges in counter-distinction from the colonized “Other.”27 
 
The Closing Down: Populist Fantasies of Plenitude 
Already in the opening of On Populist Reason, Laclau tells us that populism is not to 
be ascribed to a particular political phenomenon but to a social logic that ‘cuts across’ 
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many phenomena. He states: “Populism is, quite simply, a way of constructing the 
political,”28 or more bluntly: “populism is the royal road to understanding something 
about the ontological constitution of the political as such.”29 This constitution of the 
political is accomplished through a certain identification and movement from the 
particular to the universal, where the plebs become the populous, conceived as an ideal 
totality.
30
 This is not a logical-conceptual operation (i.e., an abstraction), but an 
attribute-performative one, where the name becomes the ground of the thing.
31
 The 
thing that is born is “the people.” As we anticipated in the previous section, according 
to Laclau, “Totality is the condition of signification as such,”32 even if this will always 
be a failed totality. By critiquing traditional epistemology and mobilizing a framework 
of populist performativity, Laclau actually argues that identity (in this case, popular 
identity) does not precede, but results from the process of representation. As such,  the 
empty signifier ‘the people’ is something different than the image of a pre-given 
totality,  it is what constitutes that totality.
33
 In this sense one could go one step further 
and claim  that populism is not “just” a particular type of social order, it is what 
constitutes order in the first place.  
 Mobilizing the same argument as the one presented above, Laclau tells us that 
totality is both impossible and necessary: impossible, because the tension between 
equivalence and difference is ultimately insurmountable; necessary, because without 
some kind of closure, however precarious it might be, there would be no signification 
and no identity.
34
 However, for Laclau, totality is not a ground but a horizon: “we need 
a plebs who claims to be the only legitimate populous.”35 Laclau continues: “But we 
also know something else: that the popular symbol or identity, being a surface of 
inscription, does not passively express what is inscribed in it, but actually constitutes 
what it expresses through the very process of its expression. (…) An assemblage of 
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heterogeneous elements kept equivalentially together only by a name is, however, 
necessarily, a singularity. The less a society is kept together by immanent differential 
mechanisms, the more it depends, for its coherence, on this transcendent, singular 
moment.”36 And the extreme form of this singularity, Laclau tells us, is an individual. 
Indeed, he argues, almost imperceptibly, the equivalential logic that takes place in the 
constitution of the people leads to singularity and identification of the unity of the 
group with the name of the leader.
37
  
For Laclau (as for Mouffe),
38
 this performative act of constitution of the people 
shows his commitment to provide a theory of populism that fits with his radical 
historical approach as opposed to any form of essentialism. Nevertheless, my argument 
is that this account of historicity remains framed by the epistemological/ontological 
logic of populism. Furthermore, the definition of social objectivity provided in the 
theory makes the political and social converge in one single moment whereby any 
threat to political stability becomes a threat to social objectivity and meaning, and thus, 
it becomes existential. It is unsurprising, then, that the effort of annulling the threat of 
the heterogeneous in this antagonistic context appears as framed within a religious 
rhetoric of sacrifice.
39
 The reduction of the logic of the political to the logic of 
antagonism is what Andrew Arato has interpreted as Laclau’s political theology: “This 
can be shown precisely in relation to Schmitt's political theology, which Laclau either 
assumes (..) or rediscovers in his desire to justify and disguise his own version of 
authoritarian politics. The ‘frontier of antagonism’ of Laclau is Schmitt's friend-enemy 
conception of politics.”40  
According to Laclau, the success of the performative operation of populism 
produces a certain indivisible nature of sovereignty while moving from the conceptual 
order (that accounts for the logic of difference) to the nominal one characterized by 
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singularity and cohesion. The problematic political implications of this process of 
singularization/nominalization are remarkable, and I will return to them in the 
following sections. Laclau brings Hobbes to this discussion and explains how, for 
Hobbes, who like himself saw the danger of radical disorder and the need of a process 
of singularization that guarantees order,
 
 only a natural singularity could become the 
sovereign.
41
 Laclau remarks that the difference is that for Hobbes this was about 
ruling, “while we are talking about the constituting of signifying totality”42. He 
continues by arguing that it is possible for a ruling signifying totality to keep its 
plurality, as, for example, in Nelson Mandela becoming the symbol of the South 
African nation. “However, the symbolic function of unification of the group around an 
individuality – and here I agree with Freud - is inherent to the formation of a 
‘people.’”43 
This totalizing operation will depend on the “social productivity” of the 
“name”.44 To put it differently, the unity of the political (in this case achieved by the 
mobilizing of the signifier ‘the people’), is a retroactive effect of its naming. But this is 
only fully achieved if some qualitative change - a force - takes place: a radical 
affective investment. Laclau claims that, “in a situation of radical disorder, some kind 
of order is needed, and the more generalized the disorder is, the less important the 
ontic content of that which restores order becomes. That ontic is invested with the 
ontological value of representing order as such”45. This striking quote reminds us that, 
although Laclau has defined heterogeneity as ultimately irreducible, he is, at the same 
time, providing an account not only of but for totality: as we have seen throughout this 
section, the process of singularization (and constitution of a totality through the taming 
of heterogeneity) is the condition of meaning, identity and order for him. As we will 
see in this and the following sections, the affective investment follows the same logic 
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of the particular-universal as presented above. The part (the plebs) becomes the whole 
(the populous). And when affect and desire enter into the scene, the struggle for 
cohesion is not just political and existential, it is also libidinal.  
In the second part of Chapter 4 of On Populist Reason (“The People and the 
Discursive Production of Emptiness”), and after having engaged with and distanced 
himself from crowd theorists at the beginning of the book, Laclau clears a space for his 
theoretical intervention on affect. The study of the role of the leader and the processes 
of identification and libidinal investment thus play a central role from the start in 
Laclau’s account of populism. However, this early reference to Freud acquires a much 
more significant and central dimension later on in the book when he asks how partial 
objects (of desire) become a trace of a totality of a (lost) enjoyment. As Laclau 
explains, the “general ontology”46 of signification and affect evolves around the 
aspiration to wholeness, or totality. By doing this, Laclau explicitly equates his theory 
of populism to the logic of desire as theorized by Lacan: “The logic of the object petit 
a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar: they are identical.”47 Indeed, according 
to Laclau, affect is not something that exists on its own, independently of language; on 
the contrary, affect is required in the signification process. In order to explain this, 
Laclau turns to Lacanian Joan Copjec, who theorizes the relation between the 
particular and the universal from the perspective of the irretrievable fullness of the 
dyad mother/child and the un-representability of the primordial mother. In Copjec’s 
words: “the lost Thing is not an impossibility of thought, but a void in Being: it is not 
that the mother escapes representation or thought, but that the jouissance that attached 
me to her has been lost, and this loss depletes the whole of my being”48. If jouissance 
is not lost, this is because traces of it remains in the partial objects that can become a 
totality. Interestingly, Copjec stresses that the partial object does not represent the 
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totality, it becomes the totality. Thus, a partial object is not a part of a whole but a part, 
which is the whole. In this way, the partial object ceases to be a partiality evoking a 
totality, and becomes – using our earlier terminology - the name of the totality:  
 
The partial object or object of lack is the one that emerges out of the lack, the 
void, opened by the loss of the original Plenum or das Ding. In place of the 
mythical satisfaction derived from being at one with the maternal Thing, the 
subject now experiences satisfaction in this partial object.
49
  
 
Laclau moves quickly to make the parallel argument that the mythical wholeness of the 
mother/child dyad corresponds to the unachieved fullness evoked – as its opposite - by 
the dislocations brought about by the unfulfilled demands. He says: “In political terms, 
that is exactly what I have called a hegemonic relation: a certain particularity which 
assumes the role of an impossible universality.”50 
By aligning himself with Freud’s understanding of processes of identification 
with the leader and with Lacan’s theory of desire, Laclau has set up a very particular 
grammar for the understanding of populism in its pivotal and impossible relation 
between the particular and universal, not only politically and existentially as mentioned 
earlier, but also libidinally: the experience of lack – or void in being - supports 
processes of identification, however, crucially also processes of othering. As the loss 
of jouissance is not complete, but is mobilized by particular objects of desire, Laclau 
tells us: “There is no populism without affective investment in a partial object.”51 
Here the concept of fantasy becomes crucial. As the extensive literature in this 
field demonstrates,
52
 fantasy operates through narratives of loss and the possibility of 
recovering fullness, and more importantly, it is also an experience of jealousy, desire 
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and hatred. My argument here is that populism, in its sameness and singularity -like 
any proto or openly authoritarian social formation that has cancelled difference- fosters 
and reproduces the logics of social antagonism. In this sense, it is pertinent to ask what 
types of open and disavowed forms of antagonism are fostered by the production of the 
people. Which is the part that will embody the whole? How do these libidinal 
dynamics inform othering in populism? What is the affect that accompanies the 
experience of the “heterogeneous”?  
By bringing the notion of fantasy in here, I am also pointing to the affect that, 
according to Lacan, does not lie: anxiety. Although in Laclau’s text, object-a has been 
mobilized to understand the libidinal attachment to the partial object that represents the 
totality (i.e., desire and fantasy), this same object-a, in the work of Lacan, is also that 
which produces anxiety. In his Seminar X, Lacan draws a graph of double entry 
naming the two corresponding vectors ‘movement’ and ‘difficulty’53. Anxiety, in this 
graph, is located at the point of greatest movement and greatest difficulty, and, as 
Lacan argues, as an affect – and different from inhibitions and symptoms – it is not 
repressed, as all that the affect does is “to affect.”54 Later in the same Seminar, and 
differentiating anxiety from fear and nervousness, he develops his ‘graph of anxiety’, 
where object-a, the ‘object of anxiety’, becomes the central topic of the Seminar. In 
this graph, Lacan situates anxiety in the middle between desire and jouissance, while 
explaining that anxiety ‘affects’ when the boundaries between them start to be erased. 
As explained by Nestor Braunstein, “desire points to a lost and absent object; it is lack 
in being, and the craving for fulfilment in the encounter with the lost object […] 
Jouissance, on the other hand, does not point to anything, nor does it serve any purpose 
whatsoever; it is an unpredictable experience, beyond the pleasure principle, different 
from any mythical encounter”55. That is, if desire refers to lack, lack in being, 
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jouissance is positivity. In Lacan’s graph of anxiety, the relation – or needed 
disjuncture – between these two realms is explained within a ‘castration’ paradigm: 
Lacan argues that anxiety appears when castration is lacking. As I have elaborated 
elsewhere
56
, if desire is mobilized by lack and framed by fantasy anxiety signals a 
presence, this means that instead of the necessary lack that puts desire in motion, the 
subject is 'asphyxiated' by the proximity of the object cause of desire. Anxiety signals a 
failure in symbolic reality, a disappearance of the fantasy support of desire. 
This brief detour through the problem of anxiety serves two purposes. Firstly, 
as a reminder that the fantasy of totality and its mobilized desire depend upon a primal 
‘phallic cut’ or, we can call it, the construction of a border. If such a border starts to 
disappear, anxiety ‘affects’; and, as Lacan says, it either manages to restore the 
weakened border (and to reinstitute fantasy), or, the subject embraces, through the 
passage a l’act, the undifferentiated death drive. The graphics of this fantasy scenario 
appear almost literal in Donald Trump’s discourse about the need to build the wall in 
order to separate the USA from Mexico. His rhetoric against the perceived “migrant 
caravan” as a human river threatening to flood American soil is remarkable. As Paul 
Verhaeghe argues in his essay ‘The Riddle of Castration Anxiety: Lacan beyond 
Freud,’57 clinical experience shows that anxiety is experienced as ‘fear of being 
devoured, falling into the void, immixture with the other; in short: the fear of 
disappearing in the enjoyment of the Other’58.  
Secondly, the detour through the problem of anxiety serves to highlight that the 
way Laclau theorizes affect is caught between two problematic poles: a totalizing 
fantasy (of wholeness depending on the existence of the border) and anxiety. One 
could say, and using Laclau’s terms, populist totality is not just a fantasy: it is the 
(phallic) fantasy par excellence. As such, it requires the constant vigilance of the 
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antagonistic frontier not only in relation to the chain of equivalence, but also and 
fundamentally, with what is considered the condition for the existence of the chain as 
such: the border that keeps the anxiety provoking threat, at bay. As I will show in the 
following sections, this has significant repercussions in the aesthetics and embodiment 
of populism. 
 
Sexualized/Racialized Social Choreographies 
Although Laclau could hardly be considered an author of the ‘sensible’, there is still a 
significant conceptualization of embodiment and of the construction of topographies 
and even choreographies of the social in his account of populism. Not only is affect 
central to Laclau’s account of populism, but hegemonic articulations consist of the 
possibility of hegemonizing time by space. In Laclau’s words: "The spatialization of 
the event's temporality takes place through repetition, through the reduction of its 
variation to an invariable nucleus which is an internal moment of the pre-given 
structure”59. That is, meaning is the production of a topography, where time, or the 
possibility of disruption, becomes tendentially eliminated. As David Howarth puts it: 
"Temporality must be conceived as the exact opposite of space. The “spatialization” of 
an event consists of eliminating its temporality."
60
. Oliver Marchart adds, "while we 
can speak of the hegemonization of time by space (through repetition), it must be 
emphasized that the opposite is not possible: time cannot hegemonize anything, since it 
is a pure effect of dislocation”61. In this sense, time belongs to the category of the 
‘political’ (ontological and negative, and, as we will see, heterogeneous 
racialized/feminine), and as time is never eliminated, space is ultimately, impossible. 
Now, following Husserl and Jameson, Laclau uses the concept of sedimentation 
(of hegemonies) to refer to the sedimentation of forms of objectivity whereby the 
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forgetting of the origin is needed in any successful hegemonic articulation.
62
 As 
Marchart comments, in Laclau’s terminology, this is understood as a fixation of 
meaning in topographies that need to be conceptualized as “sedimentations of power 
and which spatialize the temporal movement of pure dislocation into a precise 
choreography”63 . This crucial concept of sedimentation informs us that social spaces 
are always marked by the exclusionary political acts that inaugurated them, although 
these exclusions are concealed, forgotten, ‘sedimented’, ‘occluded’, precisely by their 
repetition. In this sense, any social space, Howarth argues, always remains potentially 
a ‘heterotopia’, that is, marked by heterogeneity.64 Following this reasoning and going 
back to Laclau’s theory of populist singular totalization, one could argue that 
particularly populist hegemonies (in their capacity to show the ontological constitution 
of the political as such) consist attempts to eradicate heterotopia while aiming at the 
coincidence of time and space.
65
  
This conceptualization of temporality (and spatialization) also inspired Lacan’s 
theory of sexuation, which famously holds that women is ‘not-all’ and that therefore 
only the masculine structure (marked by a void or limit) allowed for the constitution of 
a symbolic space. To clarify this, a quick detour through Lacan’s theory of sexuation is 
necessary. Without going into great detail, it suffices for the purposes of the argument 
here to remember that in his seminar XX, Lacan
66
 introduced two sets of opposed 
propositions, one describing the masculine, and one describing the other side, the 
feminine structure. The phallic function, according to Lacan's translation of the 
Freudian concept of castration, refers to beings who surrender their access to 
jouissance upon entering language.
67
 However, this surrender is of a different kind: on 
the feminine side, the positing of a limit is impossible: “Lacan answers that the woman 
is not-all because she lacks a limit, by which he means she is not susceptible to the 
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threat of castration; the ‘no’ embodied by this threat does not function for her.”68 On 
the other hand, “a universe of men is possible only on the condition that we except 
something from this universe. The universe of men is, then, an illusion fomented by a 
prohibition: do not include everything in your all!”69 The masculine position is, thus, 
characterized by a limit, or a negative element that is not included in the series of 
elements that constitute the totality.  
Lacan’s theory of sexuation follows closely the Kantian antinomies – 
mathematical and dynamical - that address the aporia of the relation between 
universality and particularity (or pure reason and empirical experience in relation to 
time, space, atomism; spontaneity or casual determinism and necessity of being). As 
Hook has explained, in mathematical antinomies (i.e., feminine), the existence of an 
‘all’ was relegated to impossibility due to the fact that no limit could be found, whereas 
that was not the case for the dynamical structure (i.e. masculine), where a boundary-
line of a sort, accounted for a demarcation. In his words, “the limitlessness of the 
phenomena in question prevents the boundaries that such a meta-position, such a 
demarcation of the ‘all’, would require”70. What this means is that perception requires 
a negative judgment.  It is only when our perceptions come to refer themselves to this 
lost object that they can be deemed objective. In other words, without the limiting 
function of the phallus, representation or the perceptual field vanishes as objectivity 
depends on the existence of a limit. In Kant’s words “If that void, and consequently 
space in general as a priori condition of the possibility of appearances, be set aside, the 
entire sensible world vanishes”71.  
This shows, in my view, a persistence of an epistemic dualism in the case of 
Laclau (as in Lacan), insofar as the ‘object’ must be accounted for in its separatedness. 
This moment of separation (or, to use Laclau’s term, ‘nominalization’) is the moment 
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of the constitution of the totality where heterogeneity is concealed – abjected - for the 
emergence of ‘the people’. Furthermore, and as seen above, the constitution of this 
totality takes place through the evacuation of temporality and the heterogeneity it 
involves.  
It is central to underline the impossibility of disentangling sexuality and 
racialization, particularly in the context of capitalism, colonialism and slavery. In 
contrast to Copjec, who argues that the primal mother remains unsignified (and as such 
it opens us to an experience of ethics and sublimation beyond the castrating Oedipal 
morality
72
), Black Studies theorists argue that blackness remains an “irresolvable 
abjection”73. Achiles Mbembe, for example, states that what escapes signification 
(when conceived as pure negativity) is the black body. In his last book, A Critique of 
Black Reason, he says: “Let us say for now that race is a form of primal representation. 
(…). Taken to its limits, race becomes a perverse complex, a generator of fear and 
torments, of disturbed thoughts and terror, but especially of infinite suffering, and 
ultimately, catastrophe.”74 He continues: “The Remainder, the ultimate sign of the 
dissimilar, of difference, and the pure power of the negative- constituted the 
manifestation of existence as an object (…) The Black Man, a sign in excess of all 
signs and therefore fundamentally unrepresentable..”75.  
In in his Stolen Life
76
 , while scrutinizing Kant, Fred Moten argues that “the 
regulative discourse on the aesthetic that animates Kant’s critical philosophy is 
inseparable from the question of race as a mode of conceptualizing and regulating 
human diversity, grounding and justifying inequality and exploitation, as well as 
marking the limits of human knowledge through the codification of quasi-
transcendental method, which is Kant’s acknowledged aim in the critical 
philosophy”77. The aesthetico-scientific concept of race, according to Moten, becomes 
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what guarantees, but at the same time endangers, the systematicity of Kant’s 
philosophy. Now, if this ‘non-wholeness’ has been theorized as feminine ethics by 
Copjec, for Fred Moten, it constitutes the space of black art:  
 
Black art stages it, performs it, by way of things breaking and entering and 
exiting the exclusionary frame of the putatively ennobling, quickening 
representations to which they are submitted, paradoxically, as the very 
enfleshment of the un- or sub representable; by way of parts improperly 
rupturing the w/holes to which they will have never belonged or never have 
been fully relegated but by which they have been enveloped.
78
 
 
It is this experience of ‘fugitivity’, limitless non-wholeness that Kant, Lacan and 
Laclau see as a threat to the stability of representation, subjectivity and meaning 
formation in general. Needless to say, unrepresentability and abjection (heterogeneity 
and the anxiety it provokes), in both its sexualized and racialized constructions, inform 
violent and exclusionary fantasies of threat and stolen enjoyment. The epistemology 
and ontology of the racialized feminine-excess requires a border to exclude it, and that 
is the function of the racialized patriarchal populist hegemony.  
As it is possible to see, Laclau’s theory of spatialization gives an account of 
how sedimentation of power takes place through the construction of topographies: 
these topographies work by repressing, concealing and disavowing what appears as 
anxiety provoking: “infinity” or the feminine-racialized threat. As such, bodies and 
spaces become not only primordial sites of repetitions (citation, iteration of 
‘meaning’), but also sites of projected fantasies because of the affective investment 
mobilized in these processes of identification.  
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Following a different argumentative route and mobilizing the Derridean notions 
of iteration, decision/undecidability and citation, Thomassen argues that, in hegemonic 
relations, objects “are already signified in a particular way”79. Although the selection 
of the signifier that will represent the whole is contingent, it is not arbitrary: “The 
particular signifiers are not equally able or likely to take up this task because it takes 
place in an already partly sedimented terrain permeated by relations of power.”80 As 
such, it is unlikely that certain groups (or demands) would be able to claim to represent 
the totality. Although Thomassen’s and my own arguments converge, it is important to 
stress here how they address a different problem: while Thomassen looks at the 
historical unevenness of power, I add a reading of the concept of the heterogeneous 
(infinite feminine/racialized threat) that allows me to see that there is an 
overdetermination in the very articulatory logic of populism. McKean points to 
something similar when arguing that Laclau remains undecided regarding racial 
difference: 
 
This seems to suggest that race is one more form of particular difference that 
can enter into chains of equivalence and potentially become linked to popular 
demands. At other times, Laclau seems to assume that race should be 
assimilated directly to heterogeneity, as when he describes blacks as among 
‘those sectors which were heterogeneous vis-à-vis the main space of political 
representation’81.  
 
In other words, we can say that there is a constitution of the social and political (a 
nominalizing/exclusionary performative attribute operation of the phallic function of 
signification) and the operation of citation and rearticulation where certain privileged 
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signifiers and particularities will either become included in equivalential terms of the 
empty signifier or excluded and remaining at the other side of the antagonistic frontier. 
It is interesting to note that Laclau dismisses Lefort’s liberal conceptualization of the 
‘empty space’ of democracy, by arguing against him that emptiness is not a datum but 
a political construction
82
. How could such careful thinker as Laclau be oblivious of the 
constitutional exclusion (as per Kantian-Lacanian terms he mobilizes in his theory) and 
of the subsequent histories of embodiment, the topographies and choreographies of that 
‘empty space’? In the context of the current and historic indigenous struggles in the 
south of Chile and Argentine, Laclau’s claim about Argentina being an “ethnically 
homogeneous country”83 only indicates, once again, a certain problematic dismissal of 
heterogeneity. 
 
Populist Aesthetics and Epidermilization of the Social 
We are now ready to address directly some questions regarding the aesthetic-politico 
regime that populism fosters, and how the sensible gets articulated. Let us recall that, 
for Rancière, politics  
 
consists in reconfiguring the distribution of the sensible which defines the 
common of a community, to introduce into it new subjects and objects, to 
render visible what had not been, and to make heard as speakers those who had 
been perceived as mere noisy animals”84. 
  
However useful this definition is, as it points towards the embodied dimension of any 
hegemony, it is also important to see its limits. Following Laclau, we need to theorize 
the radical affective investment that accompanies the distribution of the sensible, and 
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therefore, a more complex account of the sensible is needed. Jared Sexton’s definition 
of libidinal economy is particularly useful: “the economy, or distribution and 
arrangement, of desire and identification (their condensation and displacement), and 
the complex relationship between sexuality and the unconscious”85. Additionally, 
visibility in the context of the racialized order that characterizes our society becomes a 
marker of exclusion and scrutiny. Feminist philosophers
86
 have long critiqued the 
Lacanian ‘paternal metaphor’ together with scopic-economy of the primacy of the 
visual, while ‘race’ theorists have argued that to become visible doesn’t guarantee 
recognition or even survival
87
. For the black body, for example, to appear means 
exposure, scrutiny and greater vulnerability. Franz Fanon talked about epidermilization 
to describe racial visibility in relation to the white-gaze that over-determines it.
88
 In his 
engagement with Fanon in Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of the U.S. 
Antagonisms, Frank Wilderson “interrogates the assumptive logic and 
metacommentaries on political and libidinal economy, and their articulations in film, 
through a subject whose structure of dispossession (the constituent elements of his or 
her loss and suffering) they cannot theorize: the Black, a subject who is always already 
positioned as Slave”89. It is this renewal of epidermilization of the social, I would like 
to argue, that characterizes the distribution of the sensible in populism. Interestingly 
though, it operates through a double mechanism of invisibilization and hyper-visibility. 
Although risk and securitization have informed public debate in the last 
decades (in the context of terror threat, mass shootings in the USA and certainly in 
debates about refugee crisis around the world), the contemporary populist turn has 
added yet a new ingredient. Particularly in the USA, but certainly also in the leftist 
populist governments as experienced in Ecuador, and still currently in Venezuela and 
Bolivia, the ‘populous’ of populism governs trough an illusion of immediacy (as the 
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singularity claims to represent the totality) and absolute sovereignty. Often – if not 
permanently - they operate bypassing formal mechanisms of representation and 
accountability (as highlighted by critics such as Arato
90
). However, their logic and 
functioning require and depend on hyper-representation/repetition or the mediated 
hyperbolic function of the image: that is, the constant affirmation of the existence of 
‘the people’ requires both its permanent visual validation as well as a permanent 
representation of its threat. As such, this aesthetics will demand the creation of a 
regime of ‘total visibility’, as its fantasy of homogeneous plenitude requires the 
aesthetics of clear borders and transparent interiors, in order to extract contaminating 
and threatening mestizo/foreign-bodies as per the case of the US, or the bodies of 
political and other dissidents as in the case of Latin America. As shown before, this 
aesthetic regime, and using Luce Irigaray’s term ‘scopic economy,’ attempts to 
reconfigure, re-instaurate the totality – the whole - at the social level, while fixing 
individual subjects, at the same time, to clear and identifiable identities.
91
 Clean, slick, 
‘authentic’; the whole informs the part; hermetic and immobile. Populist aesthetics 
epitomizes the above-mentioned problematic framework. Although borders are 
securitized as a reaction to anxiety (“our society is becoming polluted and threatened”) 
it is worth mentioning here that, because of the imposition of its antagonistic aesthetics 
of hyper-visibility, the outcome is the proliferation of the experience of disavowed 
suffering, associated to the effects of the penalizing logic of those who have become 
occluded and hyper-visible, subjected to surveillance and excluded.  
 
Conclusion: Beyond Identification and Anxiety 
Throughout the paper, I have attempted to engage conceptually, epistemologically and 
politically with the work of Ernesto Laclau. At a conceptual level, I have tried to 
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destabilize the distinction between difference and antagonism by arguing that there is 
an intrinsic ambivalence between them. My argument has been that, when remaining 
inside the articulatory chain, heterogeneity becomes colonized, disavowed and 
invisible. In a different context, Jose Muñoz reflecting upon his own life said: 
 
I was able to enact a certain misrecognition that let me imagine myself as 
something other than queer or racialized. But such a mis-recognition demands a 
certain toll. The toll is one that subjects who attempt to identify with and 
assimilate to dominant ideologies pay every day of their lives. The price of the 
ticket is this: to find self within the dominant public sphere, we need to deny 
self”92.  
 
As we know, if visible and acknowledged, heterogeneity is excluded and posited at the 
other side of the antagonistic frontier, while being signified as repository of threatening 
lack/excess. Furthermore, I have argued that, even if securing the instability of any 
hegemonic formation, heterogeneity still seems to mostly serve the function of 
mobilizing its opposite: homogenization. That is, Laclau provides a grammar of, and 
for, social order and cohesion, as heterogeneity must be reduced and repressed for 
meaning to emerge.  
Epistemologically, I argue that uncritically mobilizing a theory of lack/excess 
informed by Kantian-Lacanian psychoanalysis (that sanctifies the un-representability 
of the racialized-feminine threat and the phallic function of signification) can only 
produce inequality and exclusion. Although Laclau correctly reads the antagonistic 
logics of patriarchal social order in its fantasy of plenitude and singularity, he – like 
Lacan - mistakes this extremely well sedimented ‘epistemology’ for an ontology of the 
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social. I have also argued that this particular understanding of heterogeneity (that 
derives from Kantian philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory) overdetermines 
hegemonic articulations in their inevitable racialization and feminization.  
The political worries of a framework that praises populism in its capacity to 
subvert power while at the same time naming populism as ‘the’ way of constituting the 
social are many. The fantasy of immediacy, the aesthetics of homogenization and the 
absolute sovereignty that derives from the identification with singularity can only be 
accompanied in a libidinal economy of threat and anxiety. In this context, marking and 
defending the border as well as eliminating its unruly heterogeneity, becomes a central 
political and aesthetic task. Nowadays, this discourse sounds all too familiar across the 
globe, most evidently in the Brexit vote that aimed primarily to eliminate free 
movement from the rest of the European Union to the UK; the open repression 
(promised and delivered by Trump) aimed at migrants arriving to the USA/Mexico 
border; Austria’s plans to ‘clamp down’ on refugees making it harder to become 
citizens; the refusal of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland to accept refugee 
quotas; and many others.  
We are left with some important challenges: how to rethink the social and the 
subject within it, without reinstating repression, anxiety and antagonism as the 
condition of possibility of meaning and identity. For Laclau the only possibility is for a 
particularity to be articulated as a totality, and be part of the logics analyzed 
throughout this paper. There are many other ways of thinking the social and the 
affective/aesthetic experience outside of the Laclauian framework. In my view, a 
critique of this type of conceptualization inevitably shows the need to rethink 
heterogeneity beyond the dualistic conception of particularity-universality and subject-
object that inform the totalizing operation of the signifier of the “one” as presented in 
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Laclau’s political ontology. This requires a very different conceptualization of the real 
(what escapes linguistic determinacy). For example, the starting point in this case 
would no longer need the conceptualization of an antagonistic border that conceals a 
foundational “lack”, but the acknowledgement of the irreducible and relational 
experiences of “being-with” that characterize the social world. What if the Kantian-
Lacanian framework is abandoned, and the real -instead of  negativity and threat- 
becomes a promise, an opening, an invitation? Although Laclau rightly criticizes 
metaphysical understandings of representation by embracing instead the concept of 
performativity, he forecloses the field of the social to the nominalizing power of 
language. Instead, I suggest exploring concepts of flesh, diffraction, diffusion, and 
infinity, as presented by various critical approaches that refuse the ontology of 
singularization and embrace instead the ethics and promise of embedded and embodied 
intertwined multiplicities. 
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